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INTRODUCTION 
In many mass tort cases, individual trials are simply impractical.  
Take, for example, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,1 a class action em-
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ployment discrimination suit that the Supreme Court reviewed last 
Term.  With over 1.5 million women potentially involved in the litiga-
tion,2 the notion of holding individual trials is fanciful.  Other recent 
examples of the phenomenon include the In re World Trade Center Dis-
aster Site Litigation3 and the fraud litigation against light cigarette man-
ufacturers,4 in which Judge Weinstein colorfully noted that any 
“individualized process . . . would have to continue beyond all lives in 
being.”5 
Faced with an unserviceable number of plaintiffs, courts have pro-
posed sampling trials:  rather than litigating every case, courts would 
litigate a small subset and award the remaining plaintiffs statistically 
determined amounts based on the results.  But while sampling is 
standard statistical practice and often accepted as evidence in other 
legal contexts,6 appellate courts have balked—based on due process 
concerns—at the notion of court-mandated, binding trial sampling.7   
 
1 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
2 Id. at 2547.  The Supreme Court rejected class certification on commonality 
grounds, see id. at 2554-57, and thousands—if not millions—of individual claims remain. 
3 See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 503-05 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (ordering a complex procedure to select a representative sample of cases for full 
discovery and early trial from the more than 9000 total cases filed). 
4 Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d sub 
nom. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008). 
5 Id. at 1247. 
6 See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Survey Research (discussing the use of sampling 
surveys in a variety of contexts, including employment discrimination, juror bias, ob-
scenity cases, and trademark litigation), in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:  THE LAW 
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 479, 483-86 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2010–
2011 ed. 2010).  See generally 2 JOSEPH L. GASTWIRTH, STATISTICAL REASONING IN LAW 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 483-528 (1988) (describing other uses of sampling in the legal sys-
tem, including the adjudication of false labeling and gender-based equal protection 
claims). 
7 See, e.g., McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 220, 231 (rejecting the district court’s proposal 
to use sample trials to determine aggregate liability in litigation over whether “light” 
cigarettes were advertised deceptively); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 151 F.3d 297, 319-20 
(5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the use of sampling in asbestos cases).  But see Dukes v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 625 n.53 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting an exception to the 
preference for individual hearings as a means to determine each claimant’s damages 
when individualized evidence is difficult to obtain), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); Hilao 
v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 786 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the sampling “meth-
odology in determining valid claims [was] unorthodox . . . [but could] be justified by 
the extraordinarily unusual” circumstances).  See generally Laurens Walker & John Mo-
nahan, Sampling Evidence at the Crossroads, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 969, 974-79 (2007) (provid-
ing an overview of mass tort cases that used sampling and arguing that Judge 
Weinstein’s proposed use of sampling in McLaughlin marked a step toward more 
efficient damage awards). 
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Despite this appellate reluctance, the controversy continues una-
bated.  Trial courts have soldiered on by using nonbinding sampled 
trials (dubbed “bellwether trials”) to induce settlement,8 and a few 
brave appellate courts, including the Ninth Circuit in Dukes, have even 
hinted at an increased receptivity to sampling.9  Given that trial courts 
have few practical alternatives, one wonders if it is just a matter of time 
before their appellate brethren recognize the necessity of sampling. 
The most common—and most salient—argument supporting trial 
sampling is economic efficiency.  Since the legal system lacks the re-
sources to litigate hundreds of thousands of asbestos cases, some kind 
of resolution seems better than none.  Otherwise, the tort system’s 
primary goals of deterrence and compensation will be profoundly un-
dercut.  Opponents’ objections predictably take a liberty- or rights-based 
approach:  defendants are entitled to individual trials, and approximate 
justice will not do, no matter what the social costs. 
Since sampling is nominally a species of civil procedure, the focus 
on efficiency and individual rights is understandable.  In this Essay, 
however, I want to explore the sampling controversy from an eviden-
tiary perspective.10  Putting aside economic and liberty interests, what 
effect does sampling have on accuracy?  Most discussions on this topic 
implicitly assume that sampling is a “second best” solution, contem-
plated only in exceptional circumstances.  Individual trials are the 
foundation of the legal system, and though imperfect, they are pre-
sumed to be the best we can do.  Thus, if we could actually try all 1.5 
million cases in Dukes, we should.  After all, since sampling involves 
estimating liability from a selected subset of cases, it would appear 
suboptimal to individualized adjudication.  Or is it? 
In the pages that follow, I offer three ways in which this “second 
best” assumption can be wrong.  Given the right conditions, sampling 
can actually produce more accurate outcomes than individualized 
adjudication.  Intuitively, sampling’s advantages come from its ability 
to borrow strength from the different cases in the sample.  Individual 
adjudication confines itself to a single case and factfinder; sampling 
 
8 See Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 581 (2008). 
9 See Dukes, 603 F.3d at 625, 627 (expressing “no opinion” about the district court’s 
specific sampling plan, but referring to sampling as “one method” to manage damage 
calculations in a large class action).  
10 For two earlier cross-cutting discussions of these issues, see Robert G. Bone, Sta-
tistical Adjudication:  Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 561, 598-617 (1993), and Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved:  
The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 815, 833-41 (1992). 
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does not.  This basic principle recurs in each Part of this Essay, which 
address averaging, shrinkage, and nonrandom sampling.  What’s 
more, the good news is that the sampling procedures proposed by 
courts frequently capture these advantages, even if the original impe-
tus may have been cost reduction and not accuracy.11 
I.  AVERAGING 
As noted in the Introduction, the primary motivation for sampling 
cases is to reduce litigation costs.  Sampling is necessary in asbestos, 
the World Trade Center litigation, light cigarettes, or any other major 
mass tort because courts are not equipped to run hundreds of thou-
sands of trials.  But these arguments overlook a more fundamental 
question:  even if we could litigate all of the pending cases individually, 
should we?  At first glance, the answer seems an obvious “yes.”  The 
apparent problem with sampling is that it makes extrapolations from 
the sampled cases to the nonlitigated cases, which introduces error.  If 
one were to litigate all of the cases individually, however, this extrapo-
lation error would disappear. 
But extrapolation is not the only source of error when estimating 
damages.  The jury itself is an imperfect device for measuring damages 
that produces error—at least in the statistical or scientific, rather than 
the legal, sense.  On this score, sampling has distinct advantages.  With 
individualized assessments, each case gets one jury, and absent remit-
titur or appellate reversal, the system is stuck with the result.  Variabili-
 
11 Two caveats to the discussion:  First, for partly pedagogical and partly practical 
reasons, I will use damage estimation as the principal vehicle to discuss sampling.  The 
dollar amounts in damage estimation are more illustrative than the dichotomous 
determinations in liability or causation, even though they are conceptually equivalent.  
Furthermore, from a practical standpoint, sampling liability would require the legal 
system to accept probabilistic notions of liability, something it has been loathe to do.  
Since liability and causation are arguably already more susceptible to class action or 
other aggregate treatment, sampling’s principal venue will often be damages anyway.  
See Bone, supra note 10, at 597 (suggesting that under the current tort regime, sam-
pling cannot be applied to liability because tort law does not “recognize[] probabilistic 
liability measures”). 
Second, the term “accuracy” in the context of damages concededly hides a funda-
mental controversy over whether certain kinds of noneconomic damages are capable of 
monetization.  The typical criticism is that there is no such thing as “accuracy” because 
damages are socially constructed and there is no hard “truth” to be found.  For the sake 
of brevity, I sidestep this philosophical debate.  Since the legal system does indeed 
monetize noneconomic damages, I assume that there is some abstract value that litiga-
tion attempts to estimate.  The fact that one can never directly measure or know the 
true value of damages—as is frankly the case with many real-world problems—does not 
prevent attempts to estimate it. 
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ties in the jury pool, mistakes made by the jury or the attorneys, or 
even nonjury related contingencies all become an unmitigated part of 
the litigation outcome.  With sampling, however, case-specific contin-
gencies even out because the case results are averaged across the sam-
ple.  In short, sampling may introduce extrapolation error, but it also 
reduces variability. 
From an accuracy standpoint, whether one prefers sampling or 
individualized trials is thus a function of case homogeneity and jury 
variability, an observation first made by Saks and Blanck.12  If the 
sampled cases are very similar (which means low extrapolation error) 
or juries are very flaky (which means high measurement error), then 
sampling and averaging will produce more stable and accurate dam-
age assessments than case-by-case adjudication.  On the flip side, if 
the sampled cases are appreciably different, or juries are reliable, 
then the conventional preference for case-by-case adjudication holds.  
The desirability of sampling thus rests on two empirical questions:  
first, a general social science question about jury behavior and relia-
bility; and second, a litigation-specific question about the homogene-
ity of the cases involved.13 
In principle, the averaging advantage discussed above has very lit-
tle to do with sampling per se.  After all, one could reap the benefits of 
averaging merely by trying each case to multiple juries and averaging 
the results.  But the working baseline is one that offers each party at 
 
12 See Saks & Blanck, supra note 10, at 833-37 (describing in detail the effect of 
sampling on reducing variation in case outcomes). 
13 The most serious critique of this analysis comes from Robert Bone, who argues 
that cases are rarely homogenous and that sampling may reduce attorney incentives, 
thereby negatively impacting accuracy.  See Bone, supra note 10, at 576-94.  The situa-
tion, however, may not be as grim as he suggests.  While certain sampling or aggregation 
schemes can negatively impact attorney incentives, the problem can be minimized by 
pooling litigation costs and outcomes, a solution that Bone himself suggests.  Id. at 591-92.   
The heterogeneity concern requires some parsing.  Some types of damages (often 
economic) are definitely heterogeneous—for example, lost wages, property damage, 
and medical expenses.  Administrative measurement in these contexts, however, is 
arguably cheap, allowing the court to use regression modeling to fine-tune payouts 
after the sampling trials.  Other damages, like pain and suffering, are more difficult to 
measure, but it is arguably appropriate to measure these amorphous damages using 
crude categories and assuming a homogeneous population.  For example, pain and 
suffering resulting from paralysis or the loss of a limb should result in a standard 
predetermined sum, regardless of the other specifics of the case.  
Interestingly, Bone’s argument about attorney incentives potentially cuts in favor of 
sampling.  If attorney incentives can significantly affect case outcomes, then there is 
likely to be a high variance in jury assessments, because their verdicts depend on attor-
ney performance.  But if juries are highly variable, then sampling will remain prefera-
ble even if the cases are not strictly homogeneous.   
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most one opportunity to litigate his case in full.  Under those con-
straints, whether sampling or individual adjudication produces more 
accurate results depends on the homogeneity of the group of cases 
and an empirical question about jury behavior. 
II.  SHRINKAGE 
Conventional thinking about mass litigation places a strong em-
phasis on commonality.  Groups of litigants may be brought together 
in a single proceeding—whether through a class action or multidistrict 
litigation (MDL)—but generally only if common issues and interests 
prevail among the group.14  The theory behind commonality is quite 
straightforward:  group apples with apples, and separate apples from 
oranges.  Most aggregation procedures thus contemplate bringing liti-
gants together to resolve common issues, and then breaking them up 
for separate litigation of party-specific issues. 
Many of the cases involving sampling, however, do not adhere as 
strongly to the commonality touchstone, again perhaps because of the 
economic efficiencies required.  For example, in Cimino v. Raymark 
Industries, Inc., Judge Parker sampled 160 asbestos cases from the 2298 
on his docket, but the cases were far from homogeneous.15  Indeed, he 
ultimately divided the sample verdicts into five rather disparate cate-
gories, each corresponding to a particular asbestos-related disease.16 
Beyond simply reducing costs, this kind of aggregate sampling also 
turns out to potentially increase accuracy.  Efron and Morris’s classic 
article about the Stein Paradox provides a useful starting point to 
understand why this is so.17  Suppose it is still early in the baseball sea-
son, and we want to estimate the likely batting average for a specific 
player at the end of the season.  Assuming no data from past years is 
available, what is the most natural estimator of the player’s end-of-
season average?  Of course:  the player’s current batting average.  In-
 
14 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (allowing class actions to proceed where “there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class there are questions of law or fact common 
to the class”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006) (providing for coordinated or consolidat-
ed pretrial proceedings when “one or more common questions of fact are pending in 
different districts”). 
15 See 751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (describing a system for determining 
damages in which sample cases from each of five disease categories went before a jury 
and all other class members received the average award of those sample cases accord-
ing to their disease category), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). 
16 The five disease categories were mesothelioma, lung cancer, other cancer, asbes-
tosis, and pleural disease.  Id.  
17 Bradley Efron & Carl Morris, Stein’s Paradox in Statistics, SCI. AM., May 1977, at 119. 
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deed, one can show that current batting average is optimal in a statis-
tical sense.18  Now suppose that we want to estimate the season-end 
batting average for a larger number of players.  Shouldn’t we simply 
reapply the principle and use each player’s current batting average to 
estimate his end-of-season average? 
For years, statisticians thought precisely along these lines until 
Charles Stein surprisingly showed otherwise.19  Stein showed that if one 
is making three or more estimates, considering information across 
players can result in a better estimate of an individual player’s batting 
average.20  The other players’ statistics may initially appear irrelevant 
because Player A’s performance would seem to have no bearing on 
Player B’s performance.  Additional reflection, however, suggests why 
Stein’s discovery makes intuitive sense.  Having data from the other 
baseball players gives us information about the league average and a 
player’s performance relative to his peers.  If a player is doing well 
early in the season, we might attribute this success to his ability, but we 
might also attribute it to random variation.  After all, given enough 
baseball players, one expects that some will be lucky or unlucky early 
in the season, and that these cases will “regress to the mean” as the 
season wears on.  Only a few exceptional players will distinguish them-
selves throughout the season.  Consequently, adjusting or “shrinking” 
each individual’s current batting average toward the overall average 
will result in estimates with lower overall error.21 
Consider how case sampling procedures can thus improve the accu-
racy of litigation.  In traditional litigation, the individual trial creates a 
single, isolated estimate of the plaintiff’s damages.  Sampling with 
strict commonality requirements can partially improve upon conven-
 
18 Optimality here is defined in the classical sense of minimizing expected 
squared error. 
19 See Charles Stein, Inadmissibility of the Usual Estimator for the Mean of a Multivariate 
Normal Distribution (mathematically proving the inadmissability of the usual estimator), 
in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD BERKELEY SYMPOSIUM ON MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 
AND PROBABILITY 197, 199-200 (1956); see also BRADLEY EFRON, LARGE-SCALE INFER-
ENCE:  EMPIRICAL BAYES METHODS FOR ESTIMATION, TESTING AND PREDICTION 1-12 
(2010) (discussing James-Stein estimators generally). 
20 See Stein, supra note 19, at 199-200. 
21 The effectiveness of shrinkage turns out to apply even when one uses completely 
unrelated data.  This “James-Stein Paradox” is the subject of various commentaries, 
although they are not applicable here.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Stigler, The 1988 Neyman 
Memorial Lecture:  A Galtonian Perspective on Shrinkage Estimators, 5 STAT. SCI. 147, 148-49 
(1990) (recasting the James-Stein estimator as a regression problem).  The key insight 
for our purposes is that an excessive focus on individualized determinations may be 
suboptimal in the long run.  Considering evidence about other, seemingly unrelated, 
individuals or individual cases can improve the overall accuracy of results. 
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tional practice, because sampling takes advantage of the aforemen-
tioned averaging effects.  But further advantage comes from having a 
single decisionmaker consider several groups of related but not nec-
essarily identical cases, much as Judge Parker did in the asbestos cases.  
This lumping of diverse groups, however, arguably violates the com-
monality required by current aggregation procedures. 
Notably, the potential for aggregate sampling to achieve shrinkage-
like results depends critically on the jury.  If a single jury considers 
several disparate plaintiff populations simultaneously, will the jury 
make assessments that are consistent with a statistical shrinkage esti-
mator?  The question is again an empirical one, but intuitively, one 
imagines that juries might perform at least some shrinkage when pro-
vided with multiple populations.  For example, in Cimino, having five 
different asbestos-related diseases under consideration presumably 
helped the jury calibrate its assessment of damages in each case.22  Sim-
ilarly, baseball fans automatically do shrinkage when relying on their 
prior experience with the game.  When a player bats a phenomenal 
.500 during the month of April, no one thinks that .500 is going to be 
the player’s season-end average; surely it will come down over time.  
The most concerning aspect of shrinkage is that while it reduces 
aggregate error, that reduction comes at the potential cost of increased 
error in individual cases.23  In the baseball example, the shrinkage 
estimates for truly exceptional players may exhibit large errors, since 
the procedure cannot distinguish talent from chance variation.  So 
although shrinkage reduces the overall (league-wide) error, predic-
tions for star players may be more inaccurate than if we had consid-
ered each player individually.  Analogously, while shrinkage may 
reduce overall systemwide error in mass tort damage assessments, 
plaintiffs with exceptionally large damages may suffer more error than 
under individualized adjudication.  We of course do not know which 
specific litigants (or baseball players) are worse off.  We only know 
that the risk exists.  
This tradeoff between systemwide error and error in the individual 
case poses an important question:  what kind of error should the legal 
system be minimizing?  Is it the expected overall error across cases or 
the expected error in each individual case?  As the shrinkage case illus-
trates, the two are not always commensurate—optimizing for one 
 
22 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
23 In statistical terms, shrinkage estimators do not uniformly reduce expected error. 
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property may come at the cost of the other.24  The knee-jerk response 
may be that minimizing error in the individual case is paramount, 
since it would be unfair for one litigant to “pay” for the better results 
of the whole.  But we make this kind of tradeoff in evidence law all the 
time.  Evidentiary rules are set up in the hope of minimizing overall 
error across cases, even if the rules may harm some (unidentifiable) 
cases as a result. 
III.  NONRANDOM SAMPLING 
One final—and striking—aspect of court-imposed sampling is that 
such sampling is often nonrandom.  For example, the six cases ulti-
mately tried in the In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation were 
hand-picked:  two by the plaintiffs, two by the defense, and two by the 
judge.25  At first glance, this kind of adversarial sampling seems unsci-
entific, a bit lazy, and perhaps even dangerous, with the only accepta-
ble justification being the need to secure party consent.  The dangers 
of convenience sampling are well known, and since the entire case 
population was available to the court, failure to use random sampling 
seems inexcusable.26 
Here again, however, sampling procedures—in this case, nonrandom 
sampling procedures—can under certain circumstances counterintui-
tively increase accuracy.  Generally speaking, nonrandom sampling is 
undesirable because it introduces bias:  it tilts the estimates in specific 
(although not always known) directions.  But the nonrandom sam-
pling seen in mass tort cases is a very particular kind.  By relying on 
party selection, courts effectively sample from the extremes of the dis-
tribution, which under some conditions can result in better estimates 
than randomly sampling from the whole.  Broadly speaking, party-
selected sampling can take advantage of information held by the par-
ties to construct a more efficient sampling procedure. 
 
24 Statistical decision theory considers further, more nuanced properties for statis-
tical estimators.  For example, when choosing an estimator, one may also want it to 
minimize the maximum possible error (minimaxity) or find the exactly correct answer 
given unlimited data (consistency), and so forth.  These complexities are beyond the 
scope of the present discussion. 
25 Alexandra D. Lahav, Rough Justice 17 (Aug. 9, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562677; see also id. at 18 (dubbing this process 
“court engineered sampling”). 
26 See id. at 24-25 (criticizing courts for not using random sampling since such 
techniques are not likely to provide reliable information); see also Saks & Blanck, supra 
note 10, at 841-42 (characterizing mass torts as a “sampling theorist’s dream” since the 
completeness of the population enables excellent random sampling). 
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Extreme value sampling apparently has ancient roots.  In a recent 
article, Davis, Friedman, and Ye discuss its appearance in the rabbini-
cal literature associated with the rather mundane (but apparently then 
important) problem of estimating the volume of chicken eggs.27  As 
they note, while averaging extreme values may initially seem “seriously 
flawed,” under certain conditions, it is “unexpectedly good, 
and . . . may even [be] optimal.”28  The problem with extreme value 
averaging is that it is highly nonrobust, meaning it is badly sensitive to 
outliers and performs terribly on asymmetric distributions.29  However, 
if the quantity being measured comes from a symmetric distribution 
with minimal outliers (e.g., a normal distribution), then this method 
can be superior to random sampling.  For example, Davis, Friedman, 
and Ye show that when the target is normally distributed and the pop-
ulation is large (five hundred cases), randomly selecting one case from 
the top ten percent of the population, another from the bottom ten 
percent, and averaging the results is statistically equivalent to a sample 
size of twelve from the full population.30  So rather than conduct 
twelve trials, the court need only conduct two.  As one might expect, 
further benefits accrue if the court tries additional cases from the ex-
tremes of the population, although with diminishing returns. 
Concededly, there are good reasons to avoid extreme value sam-
pling, particularly since we often do not have a good sense of the under-
lying distribution and cannot guarantee that the necessary conditions 
exist.31  There are, however, more sophisticated and better accepted 
nonrandom sampling schemes, and these may be suitable replace-
ments for the current one.32  But for our purposes, the statistical spe-
 
27 Harry Zvi Davis, Hershey H. Friedman & Jianming Ye, An Ancient Sampling Tech-
nique:  Flawed, Surprisingly Good, or Optimal?, CHANCE, Mar. 2011, at 19, 19-20. 
28 Id. at 19. 
29 Indeed, for a chi-square distribution, the larger the sample, the worse the esti-
mate generated by extreme value averaging.  See id. at 20. 
30 Id. at 22 tbl.3 (showing that the mean of a random selection from among the 
largest eggs and a random selection from among the smallest eggs is the same as the 
result from 11.5 sampled eggs from a batch of 500, or 11.7 from a batch of 1000). 
31 Some may worry that extreme value averaging will encourage plaintiffs to bring 
frivolous cases, but the incentives actually suggest the opposite result.  Since defendants 
get to choose a subset of the tried cases, bringing frivolous cases only helps defendants.  
Plaintiffs thus have significant incentives to bring only good claims. 
32 For example, stratified sampling techniques can capture some of the gains of ex-
treme value sampling while mitigating some of the dangers.  Further, if one really 
wanted to maximize effective sample size for estimating the mean, the median would 
be a terrific estimator (although it is unclear how one could estimate the median with-
out full litigation).  See generally Gang Zheng & Joseph L. Gastwirth, Where Is the Fisher 
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cifics are beside the point.  The point is that, once again, considering 
the population as a whole can help achieve better estimates than con-
sidering each case as an island.  In this case, having the two sides effec-
tively order their cases from best to worst provides insights that would 
otherwise be lost. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has offered a line of accuracy-based arguments in favor 
of sampling.33  Despite its origins as a mechanism to improve economic 
efficiency, trial sampling is not a “second-best” option to be considered 
only because individual adjudication is economically impractical or 
impossible.  To the contrary, sampling has unexpected advantages in 
averaging, shrinkage, and information gathering that can make it 
preferable to individualized adjudication, regardless of what our intui-
tions might initially suggest. 
Although the focus of this discussion has been on mass torts, the 
analysis has implications that extend further:  if sampling is not “second-
best,” then the legal system arguably should consider it even when it has 
the resources to litigate individual cases.  For example, would damage 
assessments in recurring cases such as medical malpractice or car acci-
dents benefit from some form of aggregation and sampling?  Because 
the underlying facts in these cases vary considerably, the exact mecha-
nism for sampling may be complicated, but as this Essay suggests, noth-
ing inherently says that individual trials are always the way to go. 
 
Information in an Ordered Sample?, 10 STATISTICA SINICA 1267, 1275 (2000) (discussing 
where most of the information about the mean comes from in an ordered sample). 
33 Cf. Lahav, supra note 25, at 29-30 (arguing that “sampling is desirable not only 
because it is efficient but also because it is fair”). 
